Challenges in Sustainability | 2013 | Volume 1 | Issue 1 | Pages 3–15

DOI: 10.12924/cis2013.01010003

Research Article

Why 'Sustainable Development' Is Often Neither:

A Constructive Critique

Alexander Lautensach

* and Sabina Lautensach

School of Education, University of Northern British Columbia, 4837 Keith Ave. Terrace, B.C. V8G 1K7, Canada;

Tel.: +1 250 615 3334; Fax: +1 250 615 5478; E-Mail: [email protected]

Human Security Institute,1025 Farkvam Rd. Terrace, B.C. V8G 0E7, Canada

* Corresponding author

Submitted: 19 December 2012 | In revised form: 1 February 2013 | Accepted: 22 March 2013 |

Published: 10 May 2013

Abstract: Efforts and programs toward aiding sustainable development in less affluent countries are

primarily driven by the moral imperative to relieve and to prevent suffering. This utilitarian principle has

provided the moral basis for humanitarian intervention and development aid initiatives worldwide for the

past decades. It takes a short term perspective which shapes the initiatives in characteristic ways. While

most development aid programs succeed in their goals to relieve hunger and poverty in ad hoc situations,

their success in the long term seems increasingly questionable, which throws doubt on the claims that

such efforts qualify as sustainable development. This paper aims to test such shortfall and to find some

explanations for it. We assessed the economic development in the world's ten least affluent countries by

comparing their ecological footprints with their biocapacities. This ratio, and how it changes over time,

indicates how sustainable the development of a country or region is, and whether it risks ecological

overshoot. Our results confirm our earlier findings on South-East Asia, namely that poor countries tend to

have the advantage of greater sustainability. We also examined the impact that the major development aid

programs in those countries are likely to have on the ratio of footprint over capacity. Most development aid

tends to increase that ratio, by boosting footprints without adequately increasing biocapacity. One

conceptual explanation for this shortfall on sustainability lies in the Conventional Development Paradigm,

an ideological construct that provides the rationales for most development aid programs. According to the

literature, it rests on unjustified assumptions about economic growth and on the externalization of losses in

natural capital. It also rests on a simplistic version of utilitarianism, usually summed up in the principle of

'the greatest good for the greatest number'. We suggest that a more realistic interpretation of sustainability

necessitates a revision of that principle to 'the minimum acceptable amount of good for the greatest

sustainable number'. Under that perspective, promoting the transition to sustainability becomes a sine qua

non condition for any form of 'development'.

Keywords: conventional development paradigm; human security; overshoot; sustainable development;

utilitarianism

under a Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).

1. Introduction

Following the dominant convention in the literature,

we define development as multidimensional

innovation or growth that achieves positive outcomes

for the quality of human lives and/or for human

security. It can manifest in the areas of financial

income, employment, distribution of wealth,

education, political autonomy, basic needs for survival,

health of populations and ecosystems, equality, self-

esteem and dignity, and freedom [1]. The latter

includes Sen's [2] standard of individual capability.

Those areas cover people's social, biological, and

economic environments and have been recognised as

the main indicators contributing to the human

development index [3] and human security index [4].

Sustainable development, then, includes any such

innovation or growth that does not compromise the

ability of future generations to develop along the

same lines ([5], p. 2). This corresponds to the

definition by the World Conservation Union (IUCN),

"improving the quality of human life while living within

the carrying capacity of supporting ecosystems" ([6],

p. 6). Thus, sustainability is all about avoiding to

transgress systemic limits.

The above listed areas in which development can

manifest suggest directly some ethical reasons why

affluent countries engage in international

development aid: When the citizens of a poor country

suffer deprivations in those areas, and their own

government and communities are not in a position to

alleviate their situation, international aid seems

indicated for several moral reasons. One of those

reasons, though rarely explicated, is self interest.

Helping a country develop into a valuable trading

partner and enabling that country to purchase goods

and services from the donor country (so-called tied

aid) are in the obvious national self interest of the

donor. The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness [7]

paved the way for development aid to become untied,

broadly coordinated among donors, and designed and

implemented by the recipient countries. But

oftentimes political and strategic considerations still

dominate the allocation decisions [8].

Much more widely advertised is the utilitarian

motivation, under which helping a sufficiently large

group of people transcend a situation that caused them

to suffer inordinate deprivations, at only minor sacrifice

to the donor, provides the necessary and sufficient

justification for aid. Likewise, deontological and virtue-

based ethics recognise a duty to relieve suffering, often

manifesting in the mission statements of charitable

organisations both religious and secular. Arguments in

support of that duty often invoke human rights and

basic needs. In practice, such humanitarian motives

tend to focus on situations where the deprivation is

most easily quantified, as in cases where populations

experience extreme poverty, unemployment, under-

education, poor health, or homelessness.

The basic and widely shared agreement underlying

these ethical motives is that knowledge of human

suffering implies a duty to actively help. Much less

general agreement is found when it comes to

choosing the most appropriate ways to help. Short

term relief measures dominate in cases of natural

disasters such as the 2010 Haiti earthquake which

displaced about 2.3 million Haitians (almost one

quarter of the total population) and killed or injured

over half a million. The UN's relief program focuses on

the restoration of the island's economy and public

health [9].

Designed as immediate disaster relief, it largely

ignores how the island's climate, soil conditions,

environmental trends, and population dynamics

constrain its long term prospects for development.

Those issues are considered beyond the program's

time horizon and beyond its goals of providing

immediate relief. In other words, international disaster

relief is seldom justified by arguments invoking

sustainability, nor would many suggest that it needs

to be. This sets it apart from international

development aid where the absence of a long-term

focus can raise considerable problems, as we will

explain presently.

2. Disaster Relief and Development Aid

The short term humanitarian priorities in disaster

relief often seem relatively straightforward, suggesting

unequivocally not only the need for immediate action

but also what choices of aid measures might be

indicated. Yet, as soon as the time frame is extended

to the medium and long term, those choices become

more debatable. This is most evident in cases of

famine relief. For example, Peter Singer [10] considers

the relief of human suffering to be a paramount moral

duty; he argued that a famine always demands

immediate food aid from any who are reasonably

able. Arguing on the same humanitarian and

utilitarian grounds, Garret Hardin [11] comes to the

opposite conclusion, that famine relief in the form of

food donations would be the worst anybody could do

to a poor country. Because it promotes population

growth without addressing the reasons for the famine,

it will only cause worse famines in years to come.

Both Singer and Hardin agree that family planning

and contraception programs must be included in any

such relief program. Curiously, neither author engages

with deontological or virtue-based rationales for aid,

which emphasise the charitable act as a duty

independent of consequentialist considerations.

The difference between the two positions lies of

course in the time frame and the preferred balance

between the strategies of short-term alleviation versus

long-term prevention. As it turns out, Singer's view

usually carries the day with many relief programs,

except that family planning is seldom included as an

integral part [12,13]. That omission again underscores

the short term perspective taken by such programs.

Yet the conflict between the two strategies points to

an ethical dilemma. One wonders just how severe the

suffering and misery must be before we ought to

ignore potential long-term complications, or how

disastrous the long-term consequences of the relief

action must be to justify the withholding of aid.

In the case of disaster relief we see no room for

justifiable compromise; its concerns lie by definition in

the short term, amounting to moral blinkers. The

challenge of finding appropriate compromises

becomes much more pressing where it regards

programs for development aid which pursue explicit

aims that extend into the medium and long term

future. We would expect such programs to be guided

primarily by considerations of long term benefits

which would logically include sustainability if the time

horizon is not specified. Thus, as long as the goals of

a development program are not delimited in time, that

development is automatically governed by the

constraints of sustainability. Conversely, a program or

initiative that promotes evidently unsustainable end

states should come with clear temporal demarcations

and disclaimers abrogating any responsibility for

consequences that might ensue beyond those dates.

We base those expectations on the ideals of

beneficence and veracity that inform the professional

codes of conduct of development workers and

academics. In this study we examined to what extent

major development programs live up to those

expectations.

3. Method

Among the many programs at the national and

international levels that all share the label of

sustainable development, international development

aid tends to benefit from a supranational perspective

and a grounding in scientific analyses of needs and

potentials. Rather than attempting to gauge the

successes of individual programs we chose to examine

the cumulative and synergistic outcomes occurring in

their most deserving recipients, the world's poorest

developing countries. We selected our sample

countries on the basis of their rankings on the Human

Development Index [3] and the Human Security Index

[4]. Countries that scored low on both indices not only

receive rather a lot of development aid, in many cases

they represent situations that render development

fundamentally imperative on humanitarian grounds.

Development in this case is hardly a whimsical option

but the only defensible course of action. Yet, unlike

disaster relief, these programs explicitly pursue long-

term goals. The question is: what shape do their

strategies take, stopgap or long term?

In order to maximise the chances of those

development efforts to achieve their objectives we

excluded from our sample of poorest countries any

that showed a failed states index (FSI) greater than

100, which includes the top thirteen [14]. Failing

states are unlikely to provide the minimum

requirements of infrastructure and political stability for

successful development. In other words, they need

more than the average kind of development aid,

ranging from peace keeping to broad social reform,

often supported by armed intervention. Because of

recent destabilising developments, Mali was omitted

from the sample in the revised version of this paper.

A program for sustainable development based on a

genuine long term perspective would seek either to

ensure the sustainable flourishing of the economy and of

human well-being, or to pave the way for a smooth

transition towards more sustainable structures and

practices. The extent to which a country operates

sustainably can be estimated by comparing its citizens'

average ecological footprint (reflecting its demand of

resources and its ecological impact) with the amount of

biocapacity available for each citizen (reflecting its

resources and ecosystem services, also referred to as

natural capital) [15-17]. Based on a previous report [18]

we use the country's sustainability quotient or SQ—the

ratio of per capita ecological footprint over its available

per capita biocapacity. An SQ of less than 1 indicates

sustainability while greater than one indicates ecological

overshoot [19]. The data are summarised in Table 1.

To assess the development of the sample countries

for its sustainability we identified a major

development aid program for each country, verified

that it explicitly named sustainable development

among its aims, and examined its major strategies for

their effects on the country's biocapacity factors

(bioproductive area and bioproductivity) and on its

ecological footprint drivers (population growth,

consumption of goods and services per person,

footprint intensity; [19], p. 41). The sum of those

effects would cause its SQ to either rise or fall. The

trend by which the SQ changes over time indicates

how sustainable the development of a country or

region is, and whether the risk of ecological overshoot

is increasing or decreasing. Where possible we

selected grant programs over loan programs as the

former contribute to Third World debt which itself

contributes significantly to unsustainable practices

(such as the replacement of food crops with

exportable cash crops). The findings are summarised

in Table 2.

Table 1. Eleven of the world's poorest countries are compared to the European Union and the world

average in their extent of sustainability. Example: Each citizen of Eritrea uses the equivalent of 0.9 global

hectares to sustain their livelihood; the country of Eritrea has 1.6 global hectares of bioproductive land to

offer to each citizen; this results in an SQ of 0.563, meaning that Eritreans live within the carrying capacity

of their land. Sources: [19,20].

Country Ecol FP

(gha per person)

Biocapacity

(gha per person)

SQ HDI ranking

Max = 187

HSI ranking

Max = 232

Burkina Faso 1.3 1.3 1.0 181 210

Burundi 0.9 0.5 1.8 185 225

Eritrea 0.9 1.6 0.563 177 218

Ethiopia 1.1 0.7 1.571 174 221

Guinea-Bissau 1.0 3.2 0.31 176 208

Liberia 1.3 2.5 0.52 182 229

Mozambique 0.8 1.9 0.421 184 198

Niger 2.3 2.1 1.10 186 222

Rwanda 1.0 0.6 1.67 166 220

Sierra Leone 1.1 1.2 0.92 180 224

Togo 1.0 0.6 1.67 162 219

European Union (27) 2.7–8.3

Eur. Av. 4.8

1.0–12.5

Eur. Av. 2.2

0.494–6.023

Eur. Av. 2.2

3–55 2–71

World 2.7 1.8 1.5 1–187 1–232

4. Finding: 'Sustainable Development' Is Often

Neither

Tab le 1 lists the state of sustainability in eleven of the

world's poorest countries, compared to the EU and

the world average. The distribution of SQ values

shows six countries operating sustainably—i.e.

drawing only on the interest from their natural capital.

The other six have exceeded their sustainable limit

and are drawing on both principal and interest. Yet

only four of those SQ values match the world average,

and none of them comes close to the kind of

overshoot exemplified by the European average of 2.2

(2003) or the US value of 2.1 (2007) [20].

The data confirm our earlier findings on South-East

Asian countries [18], as well as global surveys [20],

namely that poor countries tend to have the

advantage of greater sustainability except in cases of

excessive population size. In those cases ecological

overshoot occurs in spite of small per capita footprints

because the biocapacity resources are shared among

too large a population, resulting in rampant poverty,

often aggravated by post-colonial legacies of

inequitable power structures and mismanagement.

Those examples (in our sample, Burundi, Rwanda and

Togo, and to a lesser extent Ethiopia) show that the

SQ says nothing about a country's level of

development; it only indicates how sustainably it

operates.

In contrast to those high SQ countries, many

developing countries with smaller populations show

considerable potential to achieve the transition to a

sustainable economy, aided by the fact that their

natural capital has not yet been greatly reduced [19].

In our sample, those would be Niger and Burkina

Faso. Suitable development aid could provide crucial

support at the right time to make that transition

possible before further population growth removes it

beyond the horizon.

The remaining countries in our sample (Eritrea,

Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mozambique, and Sierra

Leone) show SQ values below 1.0, indicating that they

are conducting their affairs sustainably for the time

being. This encouraging finding needs to be evaluated

in the light of the abject poverty that abounds in all of

them. This means that the state of sustainability

represents only one of several necessary conditions

for human security and well-being. Moreover, their low

SQ does not necessarily indicate that these countries

have more resources to offer those poor multitudes;

more likely their excess productivity is exported

abroad to support other countries' overshoot. Yet, low

SQ also indicates a significant opportunity for

development aid—the chance that with the right kind

of support those countries could remain sustainable

while still relieving their poverty. The question is: are

they likely to receive such support?

This leads to the problem posed by the dynamics of

the situation. The SQ values in Tab le 1 only provide

snapshots in time; they say nothing about the

directions in which those countries are developing. An

indication about probable changes for each country is

given by its major source of development aid. Ta ble 2

lists one major donor program for each country in the

sample, along with its stated goals and the resulting

ramifications on footprints and biocapacities. The data

suggest a slim chance for an affirmative answer to the

question raised in the preceding paragraph.

Table 2: For each of the eleven countries listed in Ta ble 1, a major source of development aid is examined for its goals and its objectives regarding footprint

and biocapacity. In cases where no explicit objectives were given, probable consequences are stated. Sources are: a) Burkina Development Partnership.

http://www.burkinadevelopmentpartnership.org/index.php?id=4 (accessed on 2 March 2013); b) Burundi: Development & Cooperation – Europeaid.

http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/country-cooperation/burundi/burundi_en.htm (accessed on 2 March 2013); c) Eritrea – UN Development Assistance

Framework. http://www.er.undp.org/un_eritrea/docs/undaf_pub_eritrea.pdf (accessed on 2 March 2013); d) Development Without Freedom. http://www.

hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ethiopia1010webwcover.pdf (accessed on 2 March 2013); e) Ethiopia: Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction

Program (SDPRP). http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPRS1/Resources/Ethiopia_APR2-PRSP(March2005).pdf (accessed on 2 March 2013); f) Guinea-

Bissau: Development & Cooperation – Euopeaid. http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/country-cooperation/guinea-bissau/guinea-bissau_en.htm

(accessed on 2 March 2013); g) Document de stratégie pays et programme indicatif national pour la période 2008-2013. http://ec.europa.eu/

development/icenter/repository/scanned_gw_csp10_fr.pdf (accessed on 2 March 2013); h) History of USAID in Liberia. http://liberia.usaid.gov/node/82

(accessed on 2 March 2013); i Projects of Germany. http://41.220.166.65/reports/donors/12 (accessed on 2 March 2013); j)Commission proposes to gradually

resume development aid to the Republic of Niger. http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/10/1004&format=HTML&aged=0&language=

EN&guiLanguage=en (accessed on 2 March 2013); k) Country Context. http://web.undp.org/evaluation/documents/ADR/ADR_Reports/Rwanda/ch2-

ADR_Rwanda.pdf (accessed on 2 March 2013); l) DFID Sierra Leone – Operational Plan 2011-2015. http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications1/

op/sierra-leone-2011.pdf (accessed on 2 March 2013); m) Togo Country Strategy Paper 2011-2015. http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/

Project-and-Operations/Togo-CSP%202011-2015%20(3)%20Full%20Final.pdf (accessed on 2 March 2013).

Country

Major Source of

Development Aid

Goals of Development Program Stated objectives regarding

footprint

Stated objectives regarding

biocapacity

Burkina Faso BF Development

Partnership

Basic education,

Small business development

'Get out of poverty' None

Burundi European Development

Fund (EDF)

'Rural rehabilitation, health and general

budget support'; agricultural

development

'Reduce poverty and return to

sustainable development'

Biodiversity and environmental quality

are included among aims

Eritrea UN Development

Assistance Framework

(UNDAF)

Basic social services; MDGs; food

security; 'emergency & recovery';

gender equity;

'Enhance productivity, export

expansion, and trade and

investment in high potential growth

sectors'

MDG 7: environmental sustainability is

mentioned but not explained

Ethiopia World Bank SDPRP;

Ethiopia is a major

recipient of aid; also a

major failure;

Agricultural growth and food security;

accelerating private sector growth;

strengthening of public institutions

Economic growth is emphasized Agricultural productivity to increase; but

food aid hinders.

Guinea-Bissau European Development

Fund (EDF)

Infrastructure development, conflict

prevention, water safety, energy

sources, economic growth

Most objectives contribute to an

increase of the footprint

Strengthening biodiversity in the coastal

region is among the projects

Table 2:

Cont.

Country

Major Source of

Development Aid

Goals of Development Program Stated objectives regarding

footprint

Stated objectives regarding

biocapacity

Liberia USAID Sustainable development in political

structure and education, agriculture,

infrastructure & energy

Most objectives appear neutral

toward the footprint

Renewable energy sources are to be

developed

Mozambique Germany—Federal

Ministry for Economic

Cooperation and

Development

43 projects on education,

administration, HIV/AIDS control,

transport & infrastructure, 'sustainable

economic development'

Increase of emissions is likely Improved education likely to decrease

reproductive rate;

Niger EuropeAid—European

Development Fund

(EDF)

Health care, transport, social protection

& development (small business)

Improved roads are likely to result

in increased emissions

Reproductive health and rights are likely

to decrease population growth

Rwanda World Bank MDGs, national reconciliation, economic

growth, poverty reduction, increased

life expectancy

Most objectives contribute to an

increase of the footprint through

increased consumption

High population density and

environmental deterioration are not

being addressed

Sierra Leone UK—Department for

International

Development

'Macroeconomic stability', increased

revenue base, increased foreign

investment, economic growth

Footprint is likely to increase

significantly

None

Togo African Development

Bank & African

Development Fund

Good governance; infrastructure;

regional trade; agricultural sector

Road building is likely to increase

emissions; 'economic growth' to

increase footprint

Agricultural productivity to increase

Even considering that each country receives aid from

multiple other donors, the data indicate that these

particular donors have not fully understood the

challenge. Of even greater concern is the fact that if

development aid tends to fail in the cases of those

sustainable countries by not preventing them from

slipping into overshoot, it is even less likely to succeed

in the cases of unsustainable countries in helping them

reduce it. This reinforces critiques that point to

widespread failures of development aid in other areas

besides sustainability [21].

The findings also raise the question about the

possible impact that this development aid could have

on the sample countries, in relation to their own

domestic investments. For the countries with SQ values

greater than 1.0, the total development aid received in

2011 ranges from 3.5% of GDP (Ethiopia) to 10.8% of

GDP (Burundi) [22,23]. For the countries in the

sustainable group those percentages range from 3.8

(Eritrea) to 8.1 (Sierra Leone), except for Liberia which

received aid amounting to 35.9% of GDP. In the latter

case certainly the specific development projects

sponsored by the aid can be expected to exert a

significant effect on the future state of sustainability

status of the entire country. But even for the other

countries in the sample the lower impact of aid does

not mean that its effects will be negligible.

The main issue addressed by this paper, however, is

not the projected impact of aid but to what extent aid

projects labeled as sustainable development deserve

that label. Having established that sustainability is

hardly prevalent among the probable outcomes of the

development programs in our sample, the question

arises to what extent unsustainable development can

or should qualify as development at all. Given our

definition in the introductory paragraph, development that

is not sustainable would reduce the ability of future

generations to develop further in the same areas as are

currently envisioned. A historical example for this situation

is the early history of Cyprus where the resident

population developed the island's abundant copper

deposits by fuelling their smelters with the island's pine

forests. Today Cyprus shows neither a viable copper

industry nor any substantial pine forests [24].

Contemporary examples of unsustainable

'development' include the numerous incidences of

regional ecological overshoot where populations

demand more resources and services than their region

can sustainably deliver. The inevitable consequence is

that future generations will find their options reduced

in terms of some or most of the ten areas of

development we referred to earlier: financial income,

employment opportunities, distribution of wealth,

education, political autonomy, basic needs for survival,

health of populations and ecosystems, equality, self-

esteem and dignity, and freedom [25]. Fully half of

our sample countries fall into that category. A well

known global example is the explosive expansion of

petroleum-based industries over the past century,

bound to run its course within the next few decades

and to be entered in history as the peak oil

phenomenon [26-28]. While it lasted it brought

unprecedented affluence and comfort to much of

humanity; however, its negative long term

consequences are likely to complicate the lives of

many future generations. Whether peak oil should be

regarded as development in the sense of our

definition depends entirely on the observer's time

frame. We must conclude that over the long term no

development in the true sense will happen in those

examples. Only over short terms can unsustainable

practices qualify as development, if at all.

Ignoring the risk of tautology, authorities have

invoked 'sustainable development' as a guiding

concept at least since the Brundtland report [29];

certainly no administration would admit to its

development policies as being unsustainable. But in

order to avoid the tautology, development needs to be

understood as any measure that furthers the

transition to sustainability, to a more inclusive respect

for grantable human rights (that includes future

generations) [30], and a general commitment to the

non-violent resolution of conflicts.

The stated goals of the programs listed in Table 2

generally emphasise poverty reduction through

economic growth. Poverty provides the motive while

economic growth is their remedy of choice. Thus

these programs represent chimaeras of disaster relief

and development aid, set on alleviating an

objectionable situation without too much concern

about the long term implications of continuing growth,

or about any limiting variables that may create

additional problems over the long term. This raises

the question how so many well-paid, highly educated

experts can persist in recommending such erroneous

courses of action while any substantial progress

towards sustainability continues to elude us.

5. Why Is Sustainable Development So Rare?

The finding that very few countries in our sample are

moving towards sustainability according to this

analysis (Burundi, Liberia, and possibly Mozambique

appear to qualify) seems tragic though not entirely

unexpected. Too many development program

documents seem to promise everything to everybody,

resembling election propaganda more than genuine

plans towards the enduring welfare of humanity. The

language of the UN document on indicators of

sustainable development is devoid of any reference to

limits [31]. Another example are the UN's Millennium

Development Goals [32], listed in Ta ble 3. Likewise,

the Rio+20 United Nations Conference for Sustainable

Development revealed a curious combination of

multidisciplinary analysis and inattention to limits [33].

This widespread bias toward wishful thinking has

ideological origins, which we will examine presently.

Table 3. The Millennium Development Goals and Current Accomplishments ([32,35], adapted from [37]).

Goals Current accomplishments

Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger On track to reach below the target of

23% poverty rate

Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education Some countries on track, others

behind

Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women Some progress in education, little in

employment and political

representation

Goal 4: Reduce child mortality Some regions on track, most

developing countries behind

Goal 5: Improve maternal health Largely behind

Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases Largely behind on HIV and malaria, on

track for TB

Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability Far behind, despite vague definitions

Goal 8: Develop a Global Partnership for Development Mostly on track but definitions are

confusing and contradictory

Following Singer's view [10], the MDGs emphasise

the eradication of poverty and disease as implicit

moral duties. However, explicitly those goals are

framed as fulfilling an entitlement, the right to enjoy

'freedom from want' [34]. As we elaborated elsewhere

[25], the problem with such a right, while everyone is

of course free to claim it, is that no authority could

grant it to the more than seven billion people

inhabiting this planet at this time. The fact that the

MDGs make no mention of limits to growth implies a

worldview that considers business as usual not as

problematic but as extendable into the indefinite

future. Only someone who believes that the Earth's

resources are unlimited can regard their allocation as

a universal right for an indefinitely large population;

and only someone who believes that the world's

population and its impact have not even come close

to the Earth's carrying capacity will consider the goal

of eradicating epidemics to be realistic. In addition to

this fundamental flaw, the MDGs have been hampered

by a lack of political commitment and consensus, and

by the worldwide economic slowdown [35]. As Table 3

indicates, most of the MDGs are not being achieved

by their target date of 2015. Instead they are to be

replaced by a new set of goals, called Sustainable

Development Goals (SDGs), to be formulated by

September 2013 [36].

An explanation for this discrepancy between wishful

thinking and practical failure must take into account

the diversity of beliefs, values, and ideals—often

summarised as ideologies—that inform people's

notions of what constitutes progress [38]. Sometimes

those notions create what Ronald Wright ([39], p. 8)

referred to as 'progress traps'. Of particular

importance are those beliefs that delimit the realm of

the possible. An obvious example is cornucopianism,

the belief that the growth of populations and

economies is not subject to physical limits [40]. Under

the cornucopian delusion, progress takes a very

distinct shape of unending growth in human numbers,

their consumption, and the quality of their lives. The

absence of any scientific justification for this belief has

relegated it to the realm of implicit yet powerful

assumptions that still inform certain schools of

academic thought such as neoclassical economics

[41,42].

Some of the listed programs for sustainable

development seem indicative of cornucopianism. At

least they do not explicitly acknowledge limits to

growth or local overshoot, nor do they tend to take

into account global environmental change resulting

from the present situation of global overshoot. Many

rely on economic growth (usually measured as GDP

increase) as a means to raise income levels and

provide trickle-down benefits from investment, the

large-scale extraction of non-renewable resources to

boost employment and trade balance, and converting

from subsistence agriculture to staple industries for

export. Those policies are supported by a trust in

global trade relationships and an optimistic outlook on

the potential of market forces, complemented by

some regulation, to rectify global inequities and to

eliminate poverty worldwide. The future is envisioned

as a repetition of the past, only more of it. Raskin et

al. [43] referred to this ideology as the Conventional

Development Paradigm (CDP).

The well-publicised manifestations of the global

environmental crisis (under the broad phenomena of

climate change, pollution, resource scarcity, and the

loss of biodiversity), as well as the abundant evidence

for its anthropogenic causation, render the CDP a

rather unrealistic kind of long term thinking. This is

the kind of perspective that still moves people to

welcome the discovery of new oil deposits as good

news; without the denial of anthropogenic climate

change such news would be received with

ambivalence at best. It is also unrealistic because it

assumes that the same institutions, regimes, and

ways of thinking that undoubtedly contributed to the

global environmental crisis are able to help us

transcend it. This assumption can only be upheld if

one denies or disregards the true extent of the crisis.

It makes for an overly simplistic, laissez-faire type

interpretation of sustainability that contradicts the

bulk of the evidence reported by environmental

scientists.

While those ideological deficiencies provide a

plausible explanation for the failures of the MDGs and

related development efforts, they do not explain their

sporadic successes, and they offer little help towards

finding ways out of the conundrum. Most of the

development programs listed here derive their support

partly from sources that are not as readily quantified

as is bioproductivity—human ingenuity and spirit,

social capital, and potential for learning. Also,

ecological overshoot can proceed for quite some time

without the loss of natural capital necessarily causing

any immediate calamities [44]. Thus, development

that is unsustainable can continue sometimes for

generations before collapse becomes imminent. This

undoubtedly contributes to the slowness of the

collective learning process, as do a diverse assortment

of counterproductive myths, cognitive biases, moral

ineptitudes, and mental habits, all well characterised

in the literature on what might be summarised as

'human nature' [38,45-48].

6. A Utilitarian Theory of Development that

Humanity Can Live With

The contingencies of overshoot render it unlikely that

the problems associated with underdevelopment can

be effectively remedied by efforts that only focus on

'eliminating poverty' as the humanitarian ideal

demands—regardless of how one defines poverty

[49,50]. Two reasons conspire towards this obstacle:

The first arises from the counterproductive effects of

further global economic growth under overshoot; they

necessitate that any growth in a poor country be

accompanied by restraint in a rich country—a

politically unlikely proposition.

The second reason lies in the futility of

redistribution efforts; at this point in time, if a global

dictatorship allocated exactly equal amounts of

resources to every human being, we would still all

starve, albeit rather slowly [25]. The fact that our

current demand can only be sustainably met by about

1.5 planets means that even assuming perfect equity,

at the current consumption level one third of

humanity would be consuming part of the food

producing 'machinery' itself [19]. People living in more

extreme biogeographical regions and latitudes would

be hardest pressed. Moreover, population growth

would still proceed while food prices rise and fresh

water and soils grow scarcer [51]. This means that

the redistribution of resources cannot be the sole

prescription for food security, even though it would

certainly help alleviate some of the worst shortages.

In order to ensure lasting environmental security

and acceptable survival [52] for all, humanity must

reduce its total environmental impact before nature

does this for us in very painful ways and before many

more species are lost. This imposes a tragic inversion

on the traditional humanitarian agenda of

development. What is inverted here is nothing less

than the holy grail of utilitarianism, often phrased as

'the greatest good for the greatest number'. Our

collective environmental impact, described by the I =

PAT relationship [53], clearly indicates a range of

solution states encompassing numerous combinations

of global population sizes and per capita affluence and

technology use; all those solution states are

sustainable and include population sizes below the

current level (how far below depends partly on how

long it will take us to get there). Furthermore, Potter's

[52] hierarchy of survival modes suggests that some

of those solutions are morally preferable to others

(e.g. miserable survival for all at 5 billion vs.

acceptable survival for all at 3 billion). Others (e.g.

[54,55,12]) have come to similar conclusions. The

holy grail of utilitarians now amounts to the minimum

acceptable amount of good for the greatest

sustainable number. This number is probably no more

than about four billion people, and perhaps less than

one billion [55-57].

What does this new inverted dictum mean for

development aid? The need to reduce our numbers

does not only arise from our excessive impact. The

growing scarcity of key resources, particularly food

and potable water, causes suffering that would be

avoidable with a smaller population. Cohen [54,55]

framed the challenge of global food security in the

analogy of a communal dinner table where some

guests go hungry; in his words, the problem can be

solved in three ways: (i) prepare a bigger dinner, (ii)

put fewer forks on the table, (iii) teach better

manners. Ehrlich and coworkers [58] reduced the

challenge to a 'race between the stork and the

plough'. Others (e.g. [59,60]) indicated that little, if

any, room remains to increase food supply (i.e., speed

up the plough, or make a bigger dinner), although

adherents to the CDP (e.g. in [49]) would disagree. In

effect, reducing the global population and changing

our 'manners' are probably our only remaining

options.

The link between the emancipation and education

of women and decreases in reproductive rates seems

well established cross-culturally. Several aid programs

in our sample include educational components, and

even in the MDGs this opportunity has been

recognised under goal 3 (Table 3). Yet, as we pointed

out earlier, the need for population reduction is rarely

acknowledged explicitly. Family planning programs still

face the opposition of powerful religious and cultural

prejudices, spearheaded by collusive governments

[12]. It is also clear that many manifestations of

anthropogenic global environmental change proceed

much too quickly at this stage for the documented

reductions in fertility (or the much invoked

demographic transitions to result from them) to effect

any significant mitigation. This means that both

environmental deterioration and population growth

will proceed, albeit perhaps at reduced speeds,

towards the inevitable collision point at which time

much of international aid will need to take the form of

disaster relief.

As for our 'manners', one aspect of development

aid that could certainly benefit from revision is the

lack of honesty associated with using the label of

sustainable development. As we established earlier,

development that is truly sustainable must fulfil the

requirement of addressing the challenges of

population, distributional inequities, and overshoot. In

that sense, 'manners' include ethical standards and

dominant belief systems that bar the way towards

gains in efficiency, restraint in consumption,

adaptation to inevitable changes, and conducive

structural reforms. In all those directions, too,

reformed education can make substantial

contributions [38] and pave the way for a proliferation

in 'positive deviance' in Parkin's [61] sense. While she

applied her norms of 'sustainability-literate leadership'

mainly to individuals and sociocultural communities,

our conclusions suggest that they would be equally

beneficial among the international community.

Such deviance is necessary because it seems clear

that development initiatives that are primarily

informed by the CDP can only help in the short term

(as evident in GDP increases). In the longer term they

will do more harm than good by reducing natural

capital as evident in decreases of other statistics (e.g.

the Inclusive Wealth Indicator, IWI) and increasing

humanity's collective impact [62]. Rising GDP and

shrinking IWI have been observed with some

'emerging economies' such as Brazil and India.

Another case in point is the much acclaimed 'green

revolution' that vastly boosted food production during

the 1970s. In the short term it relieved shortages and

prevented impending famines; in the long term,

however, it will be regarded a disaster, as Hardin [11]

predicted. The couple of decades of time that it

bought us were not used wisely; instead, they were

squandered on further growth under the belief that

this revolution would never end. Now we are again

facing famines—except that our numbers have

doubled, our ecosystems are weaker, tens of

thousands of species have disappeared, natural

resources are further depleted, and global pollution

has become worse. No other misadventure of

conventional development policy illustrates the failings

of the CDP better than this missed opportunity. Its

humanitarian goals are rendered unattainable by its

obsession with 'economic growth' as a human 'need'.

In the light of our earlier conclusions such policies

should not qualify as development proper. Not even

Sen's [2] more flexible principle of 'development as

freedom' is able to accommodate ecological

constraints or bring humanity closer to the new

utilitarian ideal of minimum acceptable amount of

good for the greatest sustainable number.

Utilitarian reinterpretations of development

sometimes meet with objections based on human

rights [63]. Rights become limited by a partial

contradiction in the sense that insisting on some

rights (i.e., rights that are not grantable) will create

insecurity. In her critique of human rights theory

Thomas [64] referred primarily to the enshrining of

property rights under human rights law, which can,

under conditions of limited resources, work at the

expense of disenfranchised minorities. In the light of

overshoot certain other human rights seem similarly

counterproductive, such as the right to a 'clean

environment', 'safe drinking water', or 'adequate

nutrition'. Given a large enough global population

(today's seven billion plus would qualify) and a single

planet at our disposal, no world government could

grant such privileges to all. One additional 'right' that

has arguably proven not only ungrantable but outright

harmful is the right to procreate at will [25].

This need for changing our notions about rights

points to those challenges that are situated inside the

human psyche. By labeling nature as the non-human

'other', an inanimate heap of 'resources' for the

taking, consisting of marvellously useful little

automatons just waiting to prove their utility to

human endeavours, we ultimately set ourselves up for

moral bankruptcy and ecological suicide. What

emerges are not just the deeply problematic

ramifications of the dominant anthropocentric

environmental ethic behind such development

schemes as the UN's Millennium Goals, but a thorough

revision of what it means to be 'modern' and what

constitutes 'progress'.

Besides the obvious need to change our notions

about human security, about nature, and about

modernity, another internal challenge that is evident

from the foregoing is the need to change our value

priorities with respect to each other. As ecologies

simplify and economies falter, centralised governance

and the rule of law will become more tenuous. Thus,

global development in the true sense means not only

that most of us need to re-learn how to run self-

sufficient, resilient local communities. It also means

that we exercise compassion for those whom the

crisis will have displaced from their homes. On 10

January 2012 the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist once

more reset its Doomsday Clock closer to midnight,

citing dangers of nuclear proliferation, climate change,

and the failure of political leaders to change 'business

as usual' and to “set the stage for global reductions”

([65, p. 3). The ranks of displaced multitudes are

certain to swell once rising sea levels have inundated

some of the world's heavily populated coastal lands

[66]. In the absence of decisive initiative by the

UNHCR that would impart on environmental refugees

the status of 'world citizens' (or at the very least

accord them full official refugee status) [67], their fate

depends on the charity of other countries and on

charitable NGOs—which, in the midst of shortages

and economic downturns, cannot be taken for

granted. Clearly the human conscience represents as

important a 'tipping point' as do geophysiological

variables. Many of these challenges have been

reiterated at the Planet Under Pressure Conference

(March 2012) leading up to Rio+20 [68].

Since sustainable development in the true sense

must incorporate all of those changes it comes as no

surprise that so little of it is in evidence. If the

developed world's idealistic efforts at development aid

were really motivated by the urge to increase justice,

human security, and well-being globally while

achieving the global transition to a sustainable world,

they would not hesitate to start at the top end and

reduce the obscene levels of consumption evident

there. In many respects that would be an easier

undertaking than encouraging development at the

lower end without also promoting net growth. Yet,

even if we end up not making use of any of those

opportunities we can be assured that sustainability

will come our way eventually at the hands of mother

nature.

Acknowledgments

This article is based in part on a paper presented at

the 2nd World Sustainability Forum (2012) and a

chapter by the authors in reference [25].

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